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merits of this case. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals previously
held in South Dakota v. Ubbelohde that South Dakota was not likely to
succeed on these exact same arguments. That decision from the
Eighth Circuit limited this court's ability to grant a preliminary
injunction based on these arguments. The court therefore concluded
that South Dakota was not entitled to a preliminary injunction based
on future probability of success.
On the second factor of irreparable harm, the court held that the
Corps would irreparably harm South Dakota if it managed the water
levels. The death of rainbow smelt eggs, which would result from the
lowered water levels, would harm South Dakota's fisheries. These facts
alone persuaded the court to find for South Dakota on the factor of
irreparable harm.
The court combined the last two factors, reasoning that since all
parties involved were governmental entities, the balancing of harm
between the parties and the effects on the public interest were
essentially the same. Because there were compelling arguments on
both sides, the court held that the interests did not weigh in favor of
either party.
In conclusion, the court held that although South Dakota had
shown a threat of irreparable harm, the State did not show it was likely
to win on the merits nor did it put forth a convincing argument of
greater public interest for their cause. The court further noted that
the previous decision of Eighth Circuit was controlling and it would be
improper for the court to issue a preliminary injunction in this case.
Ryan D. Phillips

S.E. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d 26
(D.D.C. 2004) (approving water supply Settlement Agreement
negotiated by municipal electricity providers and state, provided that
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama first
vacated a previously-entered temporary injunction).
The plaintiff in this dispute ("D.C. litigation") in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, Southeastern Federal
Power Customers ("SeFPC"), was a non-profit corporate consortium of
rural and municipal electricity suppliers servicing the southeastern
United States. These suppliers receive a portion of their electricity
from the hydroelectric power generated by the Buford Dam. The
United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") built the Buford
Dam on the Chattahoochee River in the 1940s, creating Lake Lanier.
Congress initially authorized Lake Lanier and Buford Dam
expressly for hydropower generation, flood control, and navigation
purposes. The Corps contended that future local water supply usage
was always within Congressional intent, but intervening parties in this
action disagreed. Beginning in the 1970s, the Corps reserved some of
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the water in Lake Lanier for local water supply, which reduced the
overall water quantity available for power generation. The Corps
wished to convert these local storage withdrawal contracts from
interim contracts to permanent contracts, which would cause a
permanent increase in the water stored for local use and a permanent
reduction in the amount of water available for power generation. In
October 1989, the Corps drafted a water storage reallocation report
representing the permanent storage contracts for submission to
Congress. This report alarmed the downstream states, Florida and
Alabama, because it allocated such a large quantity of water to storage
for local water usage. The State of Alabama then sued the Corps in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
("Alabama court"), and the State of Florida moved to intervene on the
side of Alabama, while the State of Georgia moved to intervene on the
side of the Corps.
In 1990, the Alabama court granted a stay on the condition that
the Corps not execute any permanent water supply contracts without
prior approval from Alabama and Florida while the stay was pending.
This stay order functioned during the 1990s, and the parties
periodically updated the Alabama court about their progress in the
underlying dispute. Settlement negotiations during the 1990s resulted
in an interstate compact ("ACF Compact"), which was intended to
provide an orderly process by which the states could agree on an
allocation formula. The ACF Compact maintained the situation as
when the lawsuit was filed in Alabama in 1990, and expired in August
2003. Under the ACF Compact, the Corps continued to allow
municipal water withdrawal for community use in successively larger
amounts each year.
In December 2000, SeFPC filed its complaint in the D.C. litigation,
contending that the cumulative municipal water withdrawals resulted
in diminished aggregate water to produce the hydroelectric power that
SeFPC sold. This production decrease forced SeFPC's members to
purchase more costly energy elsewhere, and continue to pay for
Buford Dam hydropower at prices disproportionate to the quantity of
water devoted to hydropower generation. Meanwhile, the Corps
charged the municipal water suppliers proportionately less for the
water stored for municipal use under the interim contracts.
Georgia and the municipal water suppliers moved to intervene in
the D.C. litigation, and after two years of negotiations, the participants
in the litigation entered a settlement agreement ("Settlement
Agreement"). Two weeks after the parties presented the Settlement
Agreement to the court for approval, Alabama and Florida intervened
in the D.C. litigation. Alabama and Florida also revived the moribund
litigation in the Alabama court by an application for a preliminary
injunction asking that court to declare the Settlement Agreement null
and void in violation of the 1990 stay.
The Alabama court granted Alabama and Florida's application and
enjoined the Corps and Georgia from executing the Settlement
Agreement without the approval of the Alabama court. Alabama and
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Florida then intervened in the D.C. litigation, opposing the approval
of the Settlement Agreement. The court also addressed the validity of
the Settlement Agreement because more parties were before the court
in the D.C. litigation than in the Alabama action.
The court stated that a settlement agreement should be approved
if it is fair, adequate, and reasonable, so long as it is not illegal or
contrary to public policy. Alabama and Florida argued that the Corps
lacked the necessary statutory authority to carry out the obligations of
They also claimed the Settlement
the Settlement Agreement.
Agreement violated several federal environmental statutes. The court
held that while the objections might present grounds upon which to
prevent execution of portions of the Settlement Agreement, they
lacked sufficient definiteness and imminence to justify invalidation of
the entire Settlement Agreement.
In response to Alabama and Florida's first claim, the court
examined the Corps' authority to manage water storage in Lake Lanier
under the Water Supply Act of 1958 ("WSA"). The WSA limits the
extent to which the Corps can change a project without first getting
The court stated that the test for WSA
congressional approval.
compliance was whether the Settlement Agreement's adjustments and
allocations to water storage would seriously affect the other authorized
purposes of Lake Lanier. Here hydropower production was the only
authorized purpose of Lake Lanier seriously affected by the Settlement
Agreement. Because SeFPC was the only party involved in hydropower
production and supported the Settlement Agreement, the court held
that the Corps and the Settlement Agreement complied with the WSA.
With respect to Alabama and Florida's National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA") claim, section 3.1 of the Settlement Agreement
explicitly conditioned implementation of its terms on completion of
the NEPA process, and gave discretion on the timing of the process to
the Corps. The court stated that either Alabama or Florida could voice
their concerns during the public comment phase of the NEPA review
process and to Congress, if necessary, after they raised additional
NEPA claims about water supply usage and appropriate water
baselines. The court also ruled that the Corps would satisfy their
burden under the other federal statutory issues Alabama and Florida
had raised by implementing the NEPA process under the Settlement
Agreement.
The court also held that the preliminary injunction issued by the
Alabama court was valid and remained in force. Therefore, while the
court decided the Settlement Agreement was fair and reasonable, and
not illegal or contrary to public policy, it also included a proviso in its
ruling that the parties could not execute the Settlement Agreement
until the Alabama court dissolved its injunction.
David W Hall

